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Abstract
This paper reports on work in progress on using rewriting techniques for the speciﬁcation and the
veriﬁcation of communication protocols. As in Genet and Klay’s approach to formalizing protocols,
a rewrite system R describes the steps of the protocol and an intruder’s ability of decomposing and
decrypting messages, and a tree automaton A encodes the initial set of communication requests and
an intruder’s initial knowledge. In a previous work we have deﬁned a rewriting strategy that, given
a term t that represents a property of the protocol to be proved, suitably expands and reduces t
using the rules in R and the transitions in A to derive whether or not t is recognized by an intruder.
In this paper we present a formalization of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol and
use the rewriting strategy for deriving two well-known authentication attacks.
Keywords: Protocol veriﬁcation, term rewriting, tree automata, rewriting strategy.
1 Introduction
In the past few years several approaches have been applied to protocol speci-
ﬁcations in order to formally verify various properties of interest, such as au-
thentication, secrecy or conﬁdentiality, freshness, etc. These approaches range
from model checking [24,27,4] to theorem proving [26,35,36,37,22] through pro-
cess calculi [1,8,9], Horn clauses [6], multiset rewriting and strand spaces [5,10],
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rewriting techniques and strategies [11,14,23] using tree automata and ab-
stract interpretation [18,19,28]. Most of these veriﬁcation approaches have
also been implemented using either speciﬁc-purpose tools, such as AVISPA [2],
CASRUL [23], NRL [26] and Timbuk [19], or general-purpose tools, such as
ELAN [11,18], FDR [24], Isabelle [35,36], Maude [14] and SPASS [37]. There
has also been some work on comparing and combining diﬀerent approaches,
e.g. the combination of Genet and Klay’s approximation technique with Paul-
son’s inductive method [33,34].
We are interested in the use of rewriting based techniques for the formaliza-
tion and the veriﬁcation of communication protocols. Rewrite systems provide
a very natural approach to operationally describe the behaviour of a protocol.
In particular, rewrite systems and tree automata are used in [17,18,19] to spec-
ify and verify properties of security protocols by developing an approximation
technique that aims at ﬁnding that there are no attacks on a protocol, rather
than at discovering attacks. The protocol is speciﬁed through a rewrite system
R, while the initial set E of communication requests and an intruder’s ini-
tial knowledge are described through a tree automaton A such that L(A)⊇E.
Starting fromR andA, the approximation technique by Genet and Klay builds
a tree automaton which over-approximates the set of the messages exchanged
among the protocol agents. The quality of the approximation depends on an
approximation function γ which deﬁnes the subterms that can be approxi-
mated. The approximation technique can be seen as a particular completion
process between R and A, as critical pairs are computed between the rules in
R and the transitions in A. The rules derived from the critical pairs are new
transitions that are normalized using γ and then added to A. Thus, the lan-
guage recognized by the resulting approximation automaton TR↑(A) includes
all R-descendants of E. In this way, in order to prove whether a property p
is satisﬁed, it is suﬃcient to consider the intersection between the language of
TR↑(A) and the language of a tree automaton Ap which models the negation
of p and thus contains the “prohibited” terms. If such intersection is empty,
then p is satisﬁed.
In developing our approach to verifying security protocols, we have been
borrowing Genet and Klay’s formalization of a protocol, i.e. a rewrite system
R and a tree automaton A. Then, given a term t that describes a property
to be proved, we apply a rewriting strategy (deﬁned in [31]) that suitably
expands and reduces t using the rules in R and the transitions in A to derive
whether or not t is recognized by an intruder. This is done by simulating a
completion process in a bottom-up manner starting from t and trying to derive
if a transition t → qf can be generated from critical pairs, where qf is a ﬁnal
state of A. If the transition t → qf is derived by the strategy, this means that
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the term t is recognized by the intruder and thus the property represented by t
is not satisﬁed by the protocol. If t → qf is not derived, then the property given
by t is true. The correctness, termination and completeness of the strategy
depend on a notion of well-formedness on terms, which allows one to reduce
the search space of the strategy. Thus, while the formalization of the protocol
is similar to the one given by Genet and Klay, our veriﬁcation approach is
diﬀerent from their approximation technique, specially no approximation is
carried out on the transitions when applying the bottom-up derivation process.
This results in our strategy being able to derive whether a property is satisﬁed
or not.
In [31] the strategy has been applied to the typical ﬁrst case study of proto-
col veriﬁcation, i.e. the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol [29] (NSPK
for short), for reasoning about the authentication and secrecy properties. Our
experimentation on both the insecure and the corrected versions of the NSPK
has shown that the strategy is able to detect the attacks in the insecure version
and derive that the properties hold for the corrected version of the NSPK.
The strategy has then been tested on a classic example of symmetric-key
authentication protocols, i.e. the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric-Key proto-
col [29] (NSSK from now on). In this respect, besides the authentication and
secrecy properties, it is important to be able to specify and verify the freshness
of shared (symmetric) keys. This paper presents a formalization of the NSSK,
based on Genet and Klay’s approach, which is a revised and enriched version of
their rewrite system and tree automaton. In particular, session identiﬁers are
added in the relevant messages of the protocol, in order to be able to express
and reason on the freshness property. The veriﬁcation strategy, unchanged
with respect to its deﬁnition in [31], is applied to the proposed formalization
of the NSSK and two authentication attacks are derived.
The paper is organized as follows. Some basic deﬁnitions about term
rewriting and tree automata are recalled in Section 2. Section 3 brieﬂy de-
scribes the NSSK and Denning and Sacco’s attack. Next, our formalization
of the NSSK and the ingredients of the strategy are presented in Section 4.
The rewriting strategy is then illustrated in Section 5 and ﬁnally applied to
the speciﬁcation of the NSSK for deriving the attacks in Section 6. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks and directions for future work.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions
Below we summarize the most relevant deﬁnitions of term rewriting and tree
automata, and refer to [3,16,13] for more details.
A signature is a set of function symbols F =
⋃
nF
n where Fn is the set of
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symbols of arity n. Let T (F ,V) be the set of ﬁnite and ﬁrst-order terms with
function symbols F and variables V. The root symbol of a term t∈T (F ,V)
is root(t) = t if t∈V ∪F0 and root(t) = f if t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈F
n
and t1, . . . , tn ∈T (F ,V). A context C is a term in T (F ∪{},V), where  ∈ F
is a new symbol representing “holes”. Given a context C with n occurrences
of  and t1, . . . , tn ∈T (F ,V), the term C[t1, . . . , tn] is obtained by replacing,
from left to right, the n occurrences of  with t1, . . . , tn.
A rewrite system or term rewriting system (trs)R is any set {(li, ri) | li, ri ∈
T (F ,V), li ∈ V, Var(ri)⊆Var(li)}. The pairs (li, ri) are called rewrite rules
and written li→ ri. The rewriting relation →R over T (F ,V) is deﬁned as
the least relation containing R that is closed under context application and
substitution. A term t rewrites to a term t′, written t→R t
′ (or simply t→ t′),
if there exists a rule l→ r in R, a substitution σ and a subterm t|p (called
redex) at the position p, such that t|p = σl and t
′ = t[σr]p. A term t is said to
overlap a term t′ if t uniﬁes with a non-variable subterm of t′ (after renaming
the variables in t so as not to conﬂict with those in t′). Let Pos′(t) be the
set of positions of non-variable subterms of t. If li→ ri and lj → rj are two
rewrite rules (with distinct variables), p∈Pos′(li) and σ = mgu(li|p, lj), then
the equation (σli)[σrj ]p = σri is a critical pair formed from those rules.
Let
+
→ and
∗
→ denote the transitive and transitive-reﬂexive closure of→, re-
spectively. A trsR is terminating if there is no inﬁnite derivation t1→ t2→ . . .
in R. A term t is in R-normal form if there is no term s such that t→ s.
A term s is an R-normal form of t if t
∗
→ s and s is in R-normal form. A
trs R is conﬂuent if whenever s
∗
← t
∗
→ u, there exists a term t′ such that
s
∗
→ t′
∗
← u. A trs R is canonical (or convergent) if it is terminating and
conﬂuent.
A term t reduces via narrowing to a term t′, written t t′, if there exists a
rule l→ r in R, a position p∈Pos′(t) and a substitution σ = mgu(t|p, l), and
t′ = σ(t[r]p).
Let Q be a ﬁnite set of symbols, with arity 0, called states . A tran-
sition is a rewrite rule c → q, where c∈T (F ∪Q) and q ∈Q. A normal-
ized transition is a transition c → q where c= q′ ∈Q or c= f(q1, . . . , qn),
f ∈Fn and q1, . . . , qn ∈Q. A bottom-up non-deterministic ﬁnite tree au-
tomaton is a quadruple A = 〈F ,Q,Qf ,∆〉, where Qf ⊆Q and ∆ is a set
of normalized transitions. A tree automaton is deterministic if there are no
two rules with the same left hand side. The rewrite relation induced by
∆ is denoted by either →∆ or →A. The tree language recognized by A is
L(A)= {t∈T (F) | ∃q ∈Qf : t
∗
→A q}. A tree language (or a set of terms) E
is regular if there exists a bottom-up tree automaton A such that L(A)=E.
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3 The NSSK Protocol
The NSSK [29] is a well-known example of symmetric-key communication
protocol that aims at the mutual authentication of two agents communicating
through an insecure network. In the NSSK there are typically three principals:
agents A and B and a server S acting as a key distribution centre. The NSSK
protocol is described in Figure 1.
1. A −→ S : A,B,NA
2. S −→ A : {NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}KBS}KAS
3. A −→ B : {KAB, A}KBS
4. B −→ A : {NB}KAB
5. A −→ B : {NB − 1}KAB
Fig. 1. The Needham-Schroeder Symmetric-Key protocol.
The protocol must guarantee the secrecy and the freshness of KAB as
follows: at the end of a protocol session, KAB should be known only to A, B
and S, and A (resp. B) should believe that B (resp. A) has the same key KAB
created by S in the current session of the protocol. If B accepts the message
at step (5), then KAB has been sent by A in step (3) (authentication).
The NSSK has been found insecure by Denning and Sacco [15] who have
shown an authentication attack involving two sessions (i) and (ii) of the pro-
tocol, one before the other. Assume that an intruder has recorded the session
(i) and the key K ′AB, created in session (i), has been compromised and is
known to the intruder. The session (ii) can develop as depicted in Figure 2.
ii.1. A −→ S : A,B,NA
ii.2. S −→ A : {NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}KBS}KAS
ii.3. I(A) −→ B : {K ′AB, A}KBS
ii.4. B −→ I(A) : {NB}K ′
AB
ii.5. I(A) −→ B : {NB − 1}K ′
AB
Fig. 2. Denning and Sacco’s authentication attack.
At the end of session (ii), B thinks that (s)he has established a communica-
tion with A and is sharing a secret fresh key with A, while (s)he has been
communicating with I (authentication attack) and has received an old com-
promised session key (freshness and secrecy attacks). The corrected version
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of the NSSK proposed by Denning and Sacco [15] is based on adding times-
tamps to messages in steps (2)÷(3) and removing all nonces. Needham and
Schroeder [30] have proposed an amended version of the NSSK, where they
introduce a handshake between A and B at the beginning of the protocol.
Lowe [25] has later modiﬁed Denning and Sacco’s version to prevent multi-
plicity attacks by adding a nonce handshake between B and A at the end of
the protocol.
4 The Formalization of the NSSK
As in the approach developed by Genet and Klay [17,18,19] and also used by
Oehl [7,32], a protocol is formalized through a rewrite system R = RP ∪RI ,
where RP describes the steps of the protocol and the properties to be veriﬁed,
and RI deﬁnes an intruder’s ability of decomposing and decrypting messages.
This section introduces the ingredients of our rewriting strategy for protocol
veriﬁcation.
4.1 The Protocol
The signature F of R is deﬁned as follows. Let Lagt be an inﬁnite set of agent
labels. In the NSSK we are interested in the behaviour of three principals,
i.e. two agents A and B and a server S. All other agents are coded through nat-
ural numbers built using the constructors 0 and s. Thus, Lagt = {A,B}∪N.
agt(l) denotes an agent whose label is l∈Lagt. The server S is a distin-
guished principal built using the constructor serv. 3 Natural numbers are
also used for denoting the protocol session or run: r(i) represents the run i,
i∈N. mesg(x, y, c, w) denotes a message from principal x to principal y with
contents c in protocol run w. sk(x, y, w) represents a key which is shared
between x and y for communicating in protocol run w. ltk(x, y) represents
a long-term key which is shared between x and y. encr(k, x, c) denotes the
result of encrypting c with the key k (x is a ﬂag that stores the principal that
did the encryption). A term N(x, y, w) denotes a nonce generated by x for
communicating with y in protocol run w. A list made of x and y is represented
by cons(x, y). goal(x, y, w) denotes that x tries to establish a communication
with y in protocol run w. c init(x, y, z, w) represents the fact that x thinks of
communicating with y in protocol run w, but in fact x has established a com-
munication with z. c resp(x, y, z, w) denotes that x thinks (s)he has replied
to a communication requested by y in protocol run w, but in fact (s)he has
3 Note that an inﬁnite set of servers can be deﬁned in a way similar to the inﬁnite set of
agents.
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replied to a communication requested by z.
goal(agt(a), agt(b), r(j)) (1)
→ mesg(agt(a), serv(S), cons(N(agt(a), serv(S), r(j)), cons(agt(a), agt(b))), r(j))
mesg(a2, a3, cons(N(agt(a), serv(S), r(j)), cons(agt(a), agt(b))), r(j)) (2)
→ mesg(serv(S), agt(a), encr(ltk(agt(a), serv(S)), serv(S), cons(N(agt(a), serv(S), r(j)),
cons(agt(b), cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(j)), encr(ltk(agt(b), serv(S)), serv(S),
cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(j)), agt(a))))))), r(j))
mesg(a4, a5, encr(ltk(agt(a), serv(S)), a3, cons(N(agt(a), serv(S), r(j)), cons(agt(b),
cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i1)), encr(ltk(agt(b), serv(S)), a1,
cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i2)), agt(a))))))), r(j)) (3)
→ mesg(agt(a), agt(b), encr(ltk(agt(b), serv(S)), a1,
cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i2)), agt(a))), r(j))
mesg(a6, a7, encr(ltk(agt(b), serv(S)), a5, cons(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), agt(a))), r(j)) (4)
→ mesg(a7, a6, encr(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), a7, N(agt(b), agt(a), r(j))), r(j))
mesg(a8, a6, encr(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), a7, N(agt(b), agt(a), r(j))), r(j)) (5)
→ mesg(a6, a8, encr(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), a6, N(agt(b), agt(a), r(j))), r(j))
mesg(a8, a6, encr(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), a7, N(agt(b), agt(a), r(j))), r(j)) (6)
→ c init(agt(a), agt(b), a7, r(j))
mesg(a10, a6, encr(sk(agt(a), agt(b), r(i)), a9, N(agt(b), agt(a), r(j))), r(j)) (7)
→ c resp(agt(b), agt(a), a9, r(j))
cons(x, y) → x (8)
cons(x, y) → y (9)
encr(sk(agt(0), agt(x), w), y, z) → z (10)
encr(sk(agt(x), agt(0), w), y, z) → z (11)
encr(sk(agt(s(x1)), agt(x), w), y, z) → z (12)
encr(sk(agt(x), agt(s(x1)), w), y, z) → z (13)
encr(ltk(agt(0), serv(S)), y, z) → z (14)
encr(ltk(agt(s(x1)), serv(S)), y, z) → z (15)
mesg(x, y, z, w) → z (16)
Fig. 3. R = RP ∪RI .
The trs R = RP ∪RI we have been using for experimenting our strategy
on the NSSK is given in Figure 3, where RP = (1)÷(7) and RI = (8)÷(16).
Rules (1)÷(5) encode the ﬁve steps of the protocol. Every protocol step is for-
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malized by means of a rewrite rule whose left hand side expresses a condition
on the current state of the protocol (received messages and communication
requests), and the right hand side is the message to be sent if the condition is
satisﬁed. Rules (6)÷(7) formalize the properties under consideration, i.e. the
authentication properties for the initiator and the responder of the commu-
nication. The rules in RI deﬁne an intruder’s ability of decomposing and
decrypting messages. In particular, an intruder can decompose a list (rules
(8)÷(9)) and a message (rule (16)) thus learning their contents, can decrypt
the contents of a message encrypted with a session key the intruder is sharing
with another agent (rules (10)÷(13)) or with a long-term key the intruder
is sharing with the server (rules (14)÷(15)). By considering the equational
theory deﬁned by RI , we also get an intruder’s ability of composing lists and
messages and of encrypting messages with her/his shared keys. According
to the Dolev-Yao model, an intruder has further abilities, such as encrypt-
ing/decrypting messages using keys that (s)he is not supposed to know. This
is due to the fact that an intruder can learn new messages, nonces, keys, etc.,
through the execution of the protocol sessions and use such knowledge for
building attacks on the protocol. In the approach by Genet and Klay, this
ability is embedded in the tree automaton A (see Section 4.2).
Although our trs R is based on Genet and Klay’s method to formalizing
protocols, there are a few diﬀerences with respect to their rewrite system, and
two new notions are introduced in order to express and verify the freshness
property. First, the LHS operator, that keeps track of the steps applied to
yield a certain term, and the add and ∪ operators are omitted. Then, two
function symbols are used to distinguish between shared session keys (sk)
and shared long-term keys (ltk), as session keys and long-term keys have
diﬀerent properties. Finally, a number denoting the protocol run is added
as a further parameter to some function symbols, e.g. goal, mesg, sk, N ,
c init and c resp. This information is embedded in the model to be able, for
example, to distinguish shared keys between the same agents used in diﬀerent
sessions of the protocol, in order to reason on the freshness of keys. These
last two questions about diﬀerent kinds of keys and how to specify freshness
have also been addressed by Oehl [32] who, independently of our work, has
enriched his formalization of the NSSK by introducing a distinction among
keys (similar to ours) and a notion of freshness level to check the freshness of
information.
In fact, when deﬁning the rewrite system RP , we have tried to single
out some general guidelines to formalizing the protocol steps. They can be
summarized as follows. The left hand side of the ﬁrst rule is of the form
goal(agt(a), agt(b), r(j)). The left hand side of a rule, whose root is mesg,
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is such that (i) the sender and the recipient of the message are encoded as
variables; (ii) if there is an encryption, the principal that did it is a variable,
possibly diﬀerent from the sender. The left hand side of a rule (except the
ﬁrst one) is a message whose contents is equal (modulo replacing some terms
with variables, e.g. (ii) above) to the contents of the message in the right hand
side of the previous rule.
As far as the right hand sides are concerned, we have the following: (iii)
agents, server and messages are explicitly speciﬁed using the corresponding
function symbols, except in rules (4)÷(5) that encode the steps of the protocol
where the communication is between agents; (iv) the principal that does an
encryption coincides with the sender, except when the sender simply forwards
a message encrypted by another principal, as in rule (3).
These hints simply result from our experience on formalizing the usual de-
scription of the NSSK into a rewrite system. They need to be tested and ap-
plied to other symmetric-key protocols and possibly extended to other classes
of protocols.
4.2 The Intruder’s Knowledge
We now need to formalize the intruder’s initial knowledge and give rules for
deducing his/her incremental knowledge obtained while running the protocol
sessions.
The intruder’s initial knowledge is encoded by means of a tree automa-
ton A = 〈F ,Q,Qf ,∆〉, which is a simple extension of Oehl’s version [32],
where Qf = {qf}. The transitions in ∆ are listed in Figure 4. In particular,
the following transitions allow one to encode an intruder’s abilities of build-
ing messages with what is in his/her knowledge, according to the Dolev-Yao
model: mesg(qf , qf , qf , qf) → qf asserts that an intruder can build a mes-
sage with what (s)he knows; cons(qf , qf) → qf expresses an intruder’s ability
of composing a list, and encr(qf , qagtI , qf) → qf asserts that an intruder can
encrypt/decrypt information with any key (s)he knows.
The rules for deriving the intruder’s incremental knowledge are given by
means of a proof system that checks whether a term can be recognized by
the intruder. Let t be a term that describes a property to be proved or dis-
proved. In the approximation technique, checking whether t can be recognized
by the approximation automaton TR↑(A) means checking whether a transi-
tion t → qf can be generated from critical pairs. Our veriﬁcation strategy
does not build TR↑(A), but starting from t simulates a completion process
in a bottom-up manner guided by the critical pairs, thus reconstructing the
rewriting path that has led to the intruder’s knowledge of t, if any. If t → qf
can be generated during this process, the property represented by t is not
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0 → q0 0 → qint
r(q0) → qr0 s(qint) → qint
s(q0) → q1
r(q1) → qr1 agt(qint) → qagtI
A → qA agt(qA) → qagtA
B → qB agt(qB) → qagtB
S → qS serv(qS) → qserv
goal(qagtA, qagtB, qf ) → qf goal(qagtA, qagtA, qf ) → qf communication requests
goal(qagtB, qagtA, qf ) → qf goal(qagtB , qagtB, qf ) → qf
goal(qagtA, qagtI , qf ) → qf goal(qagtI , qagtA, qf ) → qf
goal(qagtB, qagtI , qf ) → qf goal(qagtI , qagtB, qf ) → qf
goal(qagtI , qagtI , qf ) → qf
r(q0) → qf intruder’s initial knowledge
r(q1) → qf ltk(qagtI , qserv) → qf
agt(qint) → qf sk(qagtI , qagtI , qf ) → qf
agt(qA) → qf sk(qagtI , qagtA, qf ) → qf
agt(qB) → qf sk(qagtI , qagtB, qf ) → qf
serv(qS) → qf N(qagtI , qagtI , qf ) → qf
mesg(qf , qf , qf , qf ) → qf N(qagtI , qagtA, qf ) → qf
cons(qf , qf ) → qf N(qagtI , qagtB, qf ) → qf
encr(qf , qagtI , qf ) → qf N(qagtI , qserv , qf ) → qf
Fig. 4. The set of transitions ∆.
satisﬁed. Moreover, by going up along the critical pairs we get to know which
terms have been previously (in the completion process) recognized by the in-
truder, thus getting some feedback on the error location. This strategy is
similar to a rewriting strategy deﬁned in [20,21] to deal with the problem of
divergence of the completion process, where the bottom-up strategy allows one
to compute the normal form of a term with respect to the inﬁnite canonical
rewrite system.
The critical pairs between the rules in R and the transitions in ∆ are
generated by the strategy in a bottom-up manner, by applying an expansion
process on terms with respect to R and then checking the (instances of the)
resulting terms for recognizability using only the intruder’s initial knowledge
∆. Section 4.3 below illustrates the expansion process and how to ensure its
termination. We now explain what we mean by recognizability.
A term t is recognizable by an intruder if qf can be derived from t using
the transitions in ∆. As the strategy simulates a completion process that
would produce an intruder’s incremental knowledge, whenever t is not directly
recognizable using ∆, the strategy is applied to those subterms of t that are
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not recognizable in ∆. Based on the proof system A (directly built from the
transitions in ∆) shown in Figure 5, we deﬁne a function rec(t) = ∅ if t A qf ,
otherwise rec(t) = {ti | t = C[ti] for some context C and ti A qf}, thus
yielding those subterms of t labelling the leaves of the proof tree of t in A
that remain unsolved.
t
∗
→∆ q q∈{qf ,qagtI}
tA q
t1 A qf t2 A qf t3 A qf t4 A qf
mesg(t1,t2,t3,t4)A qf
t1 A qf t2 A qf
cons(t1,t2)A qf
t1 A qagtI t2 A qf t3 A qf
N(t1,t2,t3)A qf
t1 A qf t2 A qagtI t3 A qf
encr(t1,t2,t3)A qf
t1 A qagtI t2 A qf t3 A qf
sk(t1,t2,t3)A qf
Fig. 5. The proof system A.
Note that the proof system A for the NSSK suitably extends the one for the
NSPK deﬁned in [31] by simply adding the inference rule for recognizability
of shared session keys.
4.3 Expanding Terms
A term t is expanded with R if a subterm of t uniﬁes with the right hand side
of a rule of R:
expansion(t,R) = {s = σ(t[l]p) | ∃ l → r∈R, p∈Pos
′(t) and σ = mgu(t|p, r)}.
Thus, an expansion step is a narrowing step with a reversed rule of R. The
expansion process may introduce occurrences of “new” variables in s. These
variables are considered as implicitly universally quantiﬁed and will be then
instantiated by means of a ﬁnite set of ground terms Inst = {c1, . . . , ck}, thus
getting the instance set I(t, Inst) = {σt | σ : Var(t) → Inst}.
Inst is a parameter of the strategy and is built as follows. The terms that
can instantiate the variables in the trs for the NSSK are constructed based on
the function symbols in the given signature, the names of principals (the server
and the agents with their labels), the numbers for denoting the intruders and
the protocol runs. We are interested in the behaviour of two agents A and B,
a server S and an intruder (represented by agt(0)) while running two protocol
sessions, typically chosen as r(0) and r(s(0)). Thus, it is suﬃcient to take
Inst = {A,B, agt(A), agt(B), serv(S), agt(0), 0, s(0)}.
A notion of well-formedness of terms is used for ensuring the termination of
the expansion process. This notion is based on the following intuition. A term
t is well-formed if it “agrees” with the syntactic structure of the rewrite system
that speciﬁes the protocol. For example, given the trs R for the insecure
NSSK, t1 = N(agt(a1), agt(a2), w) is well-formed for any protocol run w and
agent labels a1, a2, while the term t2 = N(agt(a1), sk(agt(a2), agt(a3), w
′), w)
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is not, as there is no term t in R such that root(t) = N and the second
argument of t starts with sk. One could also talk of well-sorted or well-
typed terms, in the sense that when considering the function associated to,
for example, the symbol N , this function is expected to take as input two terms
of type principal and one term of type protocol run, thus the type-checking of
t2 will fail.
We assume that the properties to be proved or disproved on a protocol
are described by well-formed terms in the sense above. Moreover, during the
expansion phase of the strategy, only well-formed terms will be considered
and the non-well-formed ones will be cut out of the search space. This might
be not enough for ensuring the termination of the expansion process (see,
for example, the expansion process with the trs for the NSPK in [31]). The
predicate of well-formedness is a parameter for the strategy: whenever other
protocols and/or diﬀerent properties are considered, the deﬁnition of the well-
formedness of terms might have to be changed accordingly. For the insecure
NSSK we give the following deﬁnition.
A term t∈T (F ,V) is well-formed , written wf(t), if (i) t∈V ∪F0 or (ii)
t= f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈F
n (n> 0) and either ti ∈V or ti satisﬁes the
following conditions based on the value of f (i = 1, . . . , n):
• f = agt and t1 ∈Lagt;
• f = serv and t1 = S;
• f = r and t1 ∈N;
• f = goal, root(t1) = root(t2) = agt, root(t3) = r and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3;
• f = mesg, root(t1), root(t2)∈{agt, serv}, root(t3)∈{encr, cons}, root(t4) =
r and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4;
• f = encr, root(t1)∈{sk, ltk}, root(t2)∈{agt, serv}, root(t3)∈{cons,N}
and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3;
• f = ltk, root(t1) = agt, root(t2) = serv and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2;
• f = sk, root(t1) = root(t2) = agt, root(t3) = r and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3;
• f = cons, root(ti)∈{N, agt, sk, cons, encr} and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2;
• f = N , root(t1), root(t2)∈{agt, serv}, root(t3) = r and wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3;
• f ∈{c init, c resp}, root(t1) = root(t2) = root(t3) = agt, root(t4) = r and
wf(ti) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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5 The Rewriting Strategy
The input to the strategy is given by the trs specifying the protocol R =
RP ∪RI , the predicate wf, the instantiation set Inst, the proof system A
based on the intruder’s initial knowledge ∆, and the well-formed term tin
describing the property under consideration. The strategy is deﬁned through
the set of inference rules given in Figure 6. An inference rule is a binary
relation between conﬁgurations, which are either (ﬁnite) sets of well-formed
terms or elements of the set {success, failure}. Thus, the inference rules either
map a set of well-formed terms into another such set (E  E′) or terminate
the derivation process (E  success or E  failure). The initial conﬁguration
is E0 = {tin}. The predicate subterm(t, t
′) is true if t′ is a subterm of t. The
results about the correctness, termination and completeness of the strategy
have been proved in [31].
Well-formed Expansion:
t∈E expansion(t,R) = E ′
E \ {t} ∪ {t′ ∈E ′ | wf(t′)}
Failure:
E = ∅
failure
Success1:
t∈E ∃t′.subterm(t, t′) ∧ root(t′) = goal
success
Cut:
t∈E expansion(t,RP ) = ∅ subterm(t, tin)
∃t′.subterm(t, t′) ∧ root(t′) = mesg
E \ {t}
Success2:
t∈E expansion(t,RP ) = ∅ not(subterm(t, tin))
∃t′.subterm(t, t′) ∧ root(t′) = mesg
I(t, Inst) = E1 ∃t1 ∈E1. rec(t1) = ∅
success
Split:
t∈E expansion(t,RP ) = ∅ not(subterm(t, tin))
∃t′.subterm(t, t′) ∧ root(t′) = mesg
I(t, Inst) = {t1, . . . , tk} ∀i.rec(ti) = ∅
E \ {t} ∪ rec(t1) ∪ . . . ∪ rec(tk)
Fig. 6. The inference rules of the strategy.
The successful termination of the strategy means that an attack has been
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detected, thus the property represented by tin is not satisﬁed. Termination
with failure means that the strategy has failed in ﬁnding an attack, thus the
property represented by tin is satisﬁed. The rule Well-formed Expansion re-
places a term in E with its well-formed expansions. Whenever there are no
terms left in E, the strategy fails without ﬁnding an attack (rule Failure). If
there exists a subterm of t the root of which is goal, then the strategy termi-
nates with success, because every communication request is in the intruder’s
basic knowledge (rule Success1). The remaining inference rules work under
the condition that a term t∈E is selected that cannot be further expanded
with the rules in RP . If there exists a subterm of t the root of which is mesg,
we distinguish on whether the input term tin occurs as a subterm of t. If tin
occurs in t, then t is deleted from E (rule Cut) as expanding t will loop without
adding information on the intruder’s knowledge. Otherwise, the instances of t
are checked for recognizability. It is suﬃcient to have a recognizable instance
of t to terminate with success (rule Success2). Given instances ti of t that are
not recognizable, rule Split replaces t in E with those subterms of all ti that
are not in the intruder’s basic knowledge, thus looking for possible further
critical peaks in the bottom-up search.
The (non-deterministic) rewriting strategy for protocol veriﬁcation is then
deﬁned as a regular expression over the names of the inference rules:
((Well-formed Expansion+ Cut)∗.(Failure+ Success1+ Success2+ Split))∗
where r∗ means iteration of the inference rule r, r.r′ means sequencing of r
and r′, and r + r′ means non-deterministic choice between r and r′. Thus,
the rewriting strategy applies well-formed expansions of terms and prunes
the derivation paths (whenever possible) in a non-deterministic way, and then
checks if either conditions for failure/success are satisﬁed or the inference steps
must be iterated from the terms added to E by rule Split.
Given the trs R, the predicate wf, the instantiation set Inst, the proof
system A and the well-formed term tin ∈L(Ap), where Ap is the negation
automaton for the property to be checked, the correctness, termination and
completeness of the strategy are formalized as follows [31].
Proposition 5.1 (correctness)
Let tin ∈L(Ap).
(i) If {tin}  success, then the transition tin → qf can be generated from
critical pairs.
(ii) If {tin}  failure, then the transition tin → qf cannot be generated from
critical pairs.
Proposition 5.2 (termination)
M. Nesi, G. Rucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135 (2005) 95–114108
The rewriting strategy terminates on any well-formed input term tin ∈L(Ap).
Note that, by deﬁnition of the strategy, the set E only contains well-formed
terms. Given any well-formed tin ∈L(Ap), the well-formed expansion process
terminates because the repeated application of the rules of R as expansion
rules will eventually produce only terms that do not satisfy the well-formed
predicate. In fact, well-formedness ensures that there cannot be inﬁnite ex-
pansions by RI , while inﬁnite expansions by RP cannot occur because terms
will eventually not unify any more with any of the right hand sides of RP . In
particular, this guarantees that the execution of the protocol, either forward
(usual rewriting) or backward (well-formed expansion), will not loop on a sub-
set of the rules in R. Moreover, by construction of rules (1)÷(5) that describe
the steps of the protocol, it cannot happen that a step is skipped, as the left
hand side of each rule (except the ﬁrst one) is a more general term than the
right hand side of the previous rule, but is not matching with any other right
hand side of rules (1)÷(5).
Corollary 5.3 (completeness)
Let tin ∈L(Ap).
(i) If the transition tin → qf can be generated from critical pairs, then {tin} 
success.
(ii) If the transition tin → qf cannot be generated from critical pairs, then
{tin}  failure.
6 Applying the Strategy on the NSSK
This section illustrates the derivation of Denning and Sacco’s authentication
attack. We consider two protocol sessions r(0) and r(s(0)) between agents A
and B, where r(0) and r(s(0)) correspond to sessions (i) and (ii) of Section 3
respectively. The assumptions are that an intruder, here represented by agt(0),
has recorded the run r(0) and the shared key skey(agt(A), agt(B), r(0)) has
been compromised and is known to the intruder. Thus, the intruder’s initial
knowledge at the beginning of run r(s(0)) also includes all messages exchanged
during session r(0) and the axiom skey(agt(A), agt(B), r(0)) A qf .
The initial term for the proof of the authentication attack is
tin = c resp(agt(B), agt(A), agt(0), r(s(0)))∈L(Aa)
whereAa denotes the negation automaton for the property of authentication.
4
The derivation develops as follows. By applying the inference rule Well-formed
4 Due to the deﬁnition of tree automaton, tin is actually c resp(qagtB , qagtA, qagtI , qr1),
that gets expanded into c resp(agt(B), agt(A), agt(0), r(s(0))). Here we abstract from these
details.
M. Nesi, G. Rucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135 (2005) 95–114 109
Expansion on {tin} using rules (7), (5), (4) inRP , the last three steps of session
(ii) are performed backward, thus yielding the following conﬁgurations:
{c resp(agt(B), agt(A), agt(0), r(s(0)))}
 {mesg(a10, a6, encr(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(i)), agt(0), N(agt(B), agt(A), r(s(0)))), r(s(0)))}
 {mesg(a6, agt(0), encr(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(i)), a7, N(agt(B), agt(A), r(s(0)))), r(s(0)))}
 {mesg(agt(0), a6, encr(ltk(agt(B), serv(S)), a5, cons(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(i)), agt(A))), r(s(0)))}
The term, say t, in the last conﬁguration cannot be further expanded and does
not contain tin as subterm. Thus, the variables {a6, a5, i} of t are instantiated
through Inst. Among the various possible instances, let us choose the substi-
tution σ = {agt(B)/a6, serv(S)/a5, 0/i} and compute the function rec on σt.
We have that the term
t1 = encr(ltk(agt(B), serv(S)), serv(S), cons(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(0)), agt(A)))
is a non-recognizable subterm of σt, i.e. it does not belong to the intruder’s
basic knowledge. Note that t1 is part of a message, say m, sent from A to
B in session r(0), that is known to the intruder by hypothesis. Using this
assumption on m and the trs RI , the recognizability of t1 can be derived
and added to the proof system A. This is not yet embedded in the strategy
that checks the recognizability of t1 by executing backward the steps that
have generated m. In fact, the strategy applies rule Split that adds t1 to the
set E and then expands t1 using rules (18), (3), (2), (1) in R. This yields the
following derivation (among possible others) that performs the ﬁrst three steps
of session (i):
t1
 mesg(x, y, encr(ltk(agt(B), serv(S)), serv(S), cons(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(0)), agt(A))), w)
 mesg(a4, a5, encr(ltk(agt(A), serv(S)), a3, cons(N(agt(A), serv(S), r(j)), cons(agt(B),
cons(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(i1)), encr(ltk(agt(B), serv(S)), serv(S),
cons(sk(agt(A), agt(B), r(0)), agt(A))))))), r(j))
 mesg(a2, serv(S), cons(N(agt(A), serv(S), r(0)), cons(agt(A), agt(B))), r(0))
 goal(agt(A), agt(B), r(0))
By rule Success1 we have success, the property represented by the term tin is
satisﬁed and Denning and Sacco’s authentication attack is thus derived.
Note that our strategy builds another derivation path leading to success,
when choosing the substitution σ′ = {agt(B)/a6, serv(S)/a5, s(0)/i} in rule
Split. This represents another authentication attack on the NSSK due to the
fact that in run s(0) the intruder replays the message in step (3), thus fooling
agent B into thinking that A is trying to establish two protocol sessions with
B (multiplicity attack [25]).
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7 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
This paper has presented a formalization of the NSSK based on rewrite sys-
tems, tree automata and proof systems, and an approach to the analysis and
the veriﬁcation of protocol speciﬁcations by means of a bottom-up rewriting
strategy. Although there are some notions in common with Rewriting Logic,
we are not using such a framework.
Our formalization of the NSSK introduces two new elements in the ap-
proach given by Genet and Klay for specifying security protocols and verifying
the secrecy and authentication properties. In order to deal with freshness of
information, we make use of a notion of protocol run (i.e. a kind of timestamp)
and distinguish between shared session keys and shared long-term keys. In his
thesis Oehl [32] has developed a similar approach to formalizing the freshness
property. The use of session identiﬁers is not new in protocol speciﬁcations
and it follows the lines of Denning and Sacco’s correction to the NSSK [15].
However, our aim is not, for the moment, formalizing the amended version of
the NSSK, but formally deriving the attacks on the insecure version. Based
on this formalization of the NSSK, the strategy is able to formally derive two
authentication attacks, including Denning and Sacco’s one.
Our strategy is inspired by a previously deﬁned rewriting strategy [20,21]
for dealing with the problem of divergence in the completion of equational
theories and by the work on the approximation technique and its application
to protocol veriﬁcation [17,18,19,33,34]. We have borrowed the formalization
of a protocol as a combination of rewrite systems and tree automata, but our
strategy does not depend on any approximation and is able to derive whether
a property is satisﬁed or not. Moreover, in the approximation technique,
the resulting automaton TR↑(A) is usually characterized by a ﬁnite set of
transitions, but their number can be very high. We think that also in this
case it can be worth applying the bottom-up strategy, as it generates a small
subset of transitions for any given input term. Finally, whenever attacks are
found on a protocol, feedback on error location can be obtained by going back
along the critical pairs in the bottom-up search and using the substitutions
applied to derive the steps of the attack.
The task of formalizing a protocol by means of a rewrite system may be
diﬃcult and error-prone. Choosing variables rather than non-variable terms in
some positions of the left (right) hand side of a rule may prevent from deriving
certain behaviours of a protocol. Our formalization for the NSSK might appear
as an ad-hoc encoding. Actually, we have tried to abstract some criteria
to help deﬁning, in particular, the rewrite system RP and improving our
understanding of a protocol. Our aim is now to check whether these criteria
can be applied to other symmetric-key protocols and possibly to other classes
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of protocols, thus developing a general (and possibly automated) approach to
the formalization of security protocols based on rewriting techniques.
We also need to test our strategy on other protocols and properties, and
show its generality and independence of the security protocol under consider-
ation. Note that, when moving from the NSPK to the NSSK, the veriﬁcation
strategy has remained unchanged with respect to its deﬁnition in [31]. We
are currently working on the Otway-Rees protocol, its formalization and the
application of the strategy on it. We are also considering the implementa-
tion of the strategy using a more expressive strategy language, e.g. the one
of the ELAN system [12], or a theorem proving environment. In general, our
strategy can be implemented in any veriﬁcation tool, which is based on the
symbolic manipulation of the representation of systems and properties and is
provided with a language of tactics and strategies. 5
Finally, more study is needed to better characterize well-formedness and
the relationship between the rules describing a protocol and the languages
characterizing the properties under consideration, by providing more general
criteria for ensuring the correctness and the termination of the strategy.
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